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Abstrat: In this paper, we introdue Paemaker, a salable and lightweight
protool to measure reliably the availability of peers. To the best of our knowl-
edge, Paemaker is the only protool resilient to the presene of selsh peers, i.e.
peers lying about their availability and minimizing their ontribution to the sys-
tem. Paemaker relies on a novel pulse-based arhiteture, where a small set of
trusted peers regularly ood the network with pulses ontaining ryptographi
values. Colleting these pulses enables peers to later prove their presene in
the system at any time, using ryptographi signatures. This new arhiteture
overomes many limitations of ping-based systems, and an be easily deployed
on ad-ho networks and soial-based topologies. Simulation results show that
our protool provides aurate availability measurements even in the presene of
selsh peers. Furthermore, our results are veried by experiments in Planetlab,
whih also illustrate the deployability of Paemaker in real networks.
Key-words: peer-to-peer, ryptography, availability, monitoring
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Pae-Maker: mesure de disponibilité d'un pair
dans les réseaux large éhelle
Résumé : La mesure de disponibilité dans un réseau pair-à-pair peut revêtir
une très grande importane pour beauoup d'appliations ollaboratives. Ainsi,
ette information est inestimable pour identier les pairs les plus stables, ou
les groupes de pairs similaires par leur disponibilité. Cependant, omme de
nombreuses appliations veulent réompenser les pairs les plus stables, il existe
une initation laire pour les pairs à mentir sur leur disponibilité réelle. Dans
e papier, nous présentons un protool léger et salabe qui permet aux n÷uds
de mesurer la disponibilité d'un pair en présene de pairs égoïstes. Dans notre
protoole, haque pair est hargé de maintenir sa propre disponibilité en ol-
letant des pulsations disséminées par une entité de onane en utilisant des
signatures ryptographiques. Celles-i permettent à tout pair de vérier par des
hallenges les informations de disponibilité transmise par un pair.
Mots-lés : pair-à-pair, ryptographie, disponibilité, monitorage
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1 Introdution
A peer-to-peer network is omposed of thousands of independent omputers,
whih aggregate their resoures over the Internet to run ollaborative distributed
appliations. Suh networks are subjet to high dynamis: omputers (peers)
may join and leave arbitrarily or be subjet to frequent disonnetions. However,
it has been observed that peers with high availability in the system are more
likely to remain in the system for a longer time [4, 16, 23℄. As a onsequene,
many peer-to-peer networks rely on peer availability to measure the stability of
peers, and use this parameter to selet peers for spei purposes. For example,
the most stable peers an be eleted as super-peers [9, 24℄, or as privileged peers
to store replias [5, 2, 7, 10℄.
Yet, to the best of our knowledge, urrent researh does not address how
availability an be measured seurely and eiently. As we disuss in Setion 9,
urrent systems either use expensive and inomplete measurement tehniques,
or rely on peers to give an honest estimation of their availability in the network.
The fat that stable peers are usually rewarded in a peer-to-peer network reates
a lear inentive to appear very stable, for instane by lying about the real
availability, in order to be granted a better status in the network. Subsequently,
suh selsh nodes may get aess to more resoures than they should be able
to aess (i.e., free riders). For instane, in a peer-to-peer bakup system, peers
that lie about their stability might get undue and undeserved aess to storage
on the most stable peers in the system.
Motivated by these observations, we present a simple and lightweight proto-
ol, alled Paemaker, to measure availability in a trusted way in peer-to-peer
networks. The main idea of Paemaker is to disseminate pulses by trusted peers
in the network. These pulses are then used by peers as proofs of presene in
the system at a given time. Essentially, through this simple sheme, peers are
able to verify the auray of the availability laims by randomly hallenging
eah other. Sine hallenged peers are expeted to use the orret pulse for the
queried period, Paemaker is able to detet selsh peers trying to appear more
available in the system. An overview of the protool is given in Setion 2, and
the omplete speiation in Setion 4.
In addition to providing high auray in availability measurements, Pae-
maker is also highly salable. It only requires that peers are onneted to enough
neighbors to form a redundant mesh to propagate the pulses. This requirement
makes Paemaker suitable for both strutured (DHTs) and unstrutured (gos-
sip [24℄) peer-to-peer networks, but also for topologies with limited ommunia-
tions, suh as ad-ho networks and soial-based topologies [20℄. Here, we fous
on a simple mesh network, to illustrate that Paemaker inherits the salability
harateristis of the underlying network. We desribe our system model in
further detail in Setion 3.
The main ontribution of our researh is providing eah peer a seure way
to notify its availability to other peers in the system in a ompletely distributed
manner and through loal ommuniations (i.e., ommuniation is only nees-
sary with neighbors) using standard ryptographi mehanisms. In this paper,
we only onsider the ase of selsh nodes, whih are trying to gain aess to
more resoures than they are allowed to by appearing more available than they
really are, for instane, by lying. For now, we did not onsider the ase where
RR n° 6594
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nodes may ollude to improve their availability, and we disuss this deision in
Setion 9.3.
We evaluated Paemaker both through analysis, simulations and Planet-Lab
deployment. Our simulation results, whih are presented in Setion 6, onrm
that Paemaker provides highly aurate availability information with very low
ost for both real and syntheti workloads. Furthermore, Paemaker remains
highly salable due to its light load. Setion 7 presents the performane of
Paemaker under dierent kinds of selsh behaviors and shows that Paemaker
is still able to provide high auray. For instane, when 5000 peers out of
100,000 lie about their availability, Paemaker is able to detet these nodes in
less than 5 days by sending hallenges only one a day and drive the error in
availability measurements bak to negligible. Similarly, Paemaker is able to
tolerate well the eet of 30% selsh peers, whih stop disseminating pulses in
the hopes of improving their availability by reduing the availability of their
neighbors. Finally, we deployed Paemaker on a 170-node Planet-Lab testbed,
whih again onrmed a very good math between the measured and the real
availability (see Setion 8). Based on our simulation results and our experiene
with Planet-Lab deployment, we onlude that Paemaker provides a simple,
low-ost, salable and aurate way to measure peer availability in the presene
of selsh peers.
2 Paemaker in a nutshell
Paemaker is a simple and lightweight protool to trak peer availability in a
large-sale system. In Paemaker, eah peer is in harge of maintaining its
own availability measure and providing it to other peers. Yet this delared
availability an be arbitrarily heked in a peer-to-peer fashion in order to detet
selsh peers.
In a nutshell, Paemaker works as follows: a server is in harge of periodially
disseminating pulses in the system, say one pulse per hour. Suh pulses are
propagated in the system one by all the peers in the network to their neighbors.
Eah peer maintains a list of the pulses it has heard of and uses this list to prove
its availability in the system. Using this simple sheme, Paemaker provides
deentralized veriation of peer availability in the presene of selsh peers.
Selsh behaviors onsidered in this paper inlude, for instane, trying to
obstrut pulse dissemination or laiming, untruthfully, being onneted to the
system when not. To tolerate suh selsh behaviors, pulses are generated and
signed by a trusted entity. The signature erties the assoiation between the
pulse and its diusion time. Hene, when peers send their availability to other
peers, they might reeive a hallenge in return. More speially, a peer A
may ask a peer B to provide a proof for a subset of the time periods that
peer A laims it was available. A liar is deteted easily sine peers should be
able to ompute suh a proof using the pulses orresponding to the hallenged
periods. Note that we do not onsider the ase where a peer propagates pulses
indenitely to provide other peers with pulses generated when they were not
online. Suh maliious behaviors are part of the problem of olluding peers, and
just disussed in Setion 9.3.
INRIA
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3 Model
3.1 Denitions
The goal of Paemaker is to seure the measure of peer availability in a peer-
to-peer network. Peer availability an be dened by two metris aording to
the ontext:
 The ratio of time that the peer spent onneted to the network, whih is
a value in the interval [0, 1]. This metri an be used diretly to estimate
the stability of the peer or its life expetany.
 The intervals of time when the peer was onneted to the network. This
metri an be used to detet regular patterns in peer behaviors, predit fu-
ture onnetions and disonnetions, or dierentiate between a temporary
disonnetion from a denitive departure.
Paemaker provides an approximation of the seond metri, from whih the rst
one an be derived. Essentially, we dene the system availability as the average
availability over all peers in the network. Finally, a group of peers an be
attahed a spei lass of availability depending on the assoiated appliation.
For instane, peers with availability greater than 95% an be onsidered to be
in the super-peer lass.
In a system that favors highly available peers, peers may exhibit various
selsh and maliious behaviors:
 Opportunisti peers only fulll the steps of the protool required to get
a good status, but without impating the status of other peers.
 Lazy peers only fulll the steps of the protool required to get a good
status, and do so even when suh a behavior an impat the status of
other peers.
 Lying peers try to improve their own status by lying. They don't impat
diretly the status of others, but they might get undeserved aess to
resoures.
 Colluding peers ollaborate with eah other either to improve their own
status or to disrupt the system.
Paemaker seures the measure of availability against the rst three types of
behavior, whih are all selsh. Dealing with olluding peers is disussed in
Setion 9.3.
3.2 Network Model
We onsider a large-sale network (more than tens of thousands of omputers)
omposed of nodes (or peers), onneted by a ommuniation medium, typially
IP. We assume there exists a logial overlay network where eah node is aware
of a small portion of the network, i.e. it knows the IP addresses of a set of Dmax
neighbors. This is typially the ase in both strutured and unstrutured peer-
to-peer networks. In the network, peers ommuniate by sending asynhronous
messages. Although there is no bound on ommuniation delays, most messages
RR n° 6594
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are assumed to be reeived after a short delay and assumed to be lost after a
longer delay. Although not a requirement, we expet nodes to onnet through
FIFO hannels, whih enfores sequentiality of messages. Additionally, there
also exists a global lok, with whih omputer loks are loosely oupled. This
is neessary for a peer to know at whih periods (the periods are onsidered
system-wise) it was onneted to the system. Hene, peers have an approximate
agreement on time.
Paemaker relies on the existene of a trusted entity. In this paper, we
assume there exists partiular peers, whih are alled the servers. Paemaker
does not require the non-server peers to know the identity of the servers or any
other peer. However, it is assumed that the overlay network is onneted enough
to ensure that every peer in the network is reahable from at least one of the
servers. Sine servers have a spei role in the protool, they may have a higher
degree than Dmax. This helps, for instane, to prevent Sybil attaks that try
to irle servers to disrupt the diusion of pulses. For the sake of simpliity, in
the rest of the paper, we onsider a single-server system. This assumption does
not aet our results, sine no ommuniation is required between the servers.
3.3 Cryptographi Model
We assume that peers have aess to strong ryptographi primitives, speially
for publi-private key operations, whih are the following:
 generate_pair(): Generates a new pair of publi-private keys. The
ommon usage is that the private key, Kpriv, is kept seret by the peer,
while the publi key, Kpub, is known to other peers in the system.
 sign(data, Kpriv): Returns a signature for data using the private key
Kpriv.
 verify(S, data, Kpub): Veries that S is a signature for data that was
reated using the private key Kpriv assoiated with Kpub.
 hash(data): Returns the hash of data.
We assume that there is a speial pair of keys, one publi (alled KSpub)
known by all peers in the system, one seret (alled KSpriv) known only by
the server. Eah peer p in the system also owns a pair of keys, noted Kp,pub
and Kp,priv, to sign data. We also dene Hp = hash(Kp,pub), and use it as
unique identier for p in the network. These keys should also be used by a
peer-to-peer appliation running on top of Paemaker to prevent selsh peers
from easily hanging their identity when they are deteted. Furthermore, we
assume there exists a way for peers to exhange their publi keys by either using
dediated messages or due to ryptographi ommuniation protools already in
plae (suh as TLS [6℄). Finally, we assume these operations provide a high level
of seurity (i.e., it is almost impossible to break the ryptographi properties of
these funtions by suh as having a ollision in the hash funtion) in the time
limits needed for the appliation [15℄.
INRIA
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Figure 1: All peers are onneted through a redundant mesh to the server. Here, the
number in every node represents a 3-bit availability history as (3rd, 2nd, 1st) rounds.
The arrows depit the pulse propagation. Every hour, a new pulse is propagated in
the mesh by the server.
4 Paemaker in Detail
Paemaker is omposed of three sub-protools: (1) the pulse dissemination pro-
tool; (2) the availability inquiry protool and (3) the availability veriation
protool, whih are presented in their respetive setions in the remainder of
this setion.
4.1 Pulse dissemination protool
The server in Paemaker is in harge of generating one pulse over a given period
of time P . The dissemination of a pulse onsists of eah peer forwarding it
one to all its neighbors. An example of the pulse dissemination is depited
in Figure 1. The gure shows a redundant mesh network, where there exists
multiple paths between eah peer in the network. This redundany is essential
to derease the impat of peers that do not follow the protool (i.e., the impat
of nodes that do not forward the pulse to their neighbors).
A pulse T
i
, whih is generated by the server for time i, is a tuple (i, Kipub,
K
i
priv, S
i
), where K
i
pub and K
i
priv is a new fresh publi-private key pair. The
publi-private key pairs are generated by the server on-demand. The pulse
also inludes S
i
, whih is a signature of (i, Kipub) using the servers' private key
KSpriv. The server diuses the pulse to its neighbor set (NS) at time i (ode
Fig. 2).
Every peer keeps an history of these pulses, representing its presene in the
network during a window of time Nt × P . On reeipt of a new pulse, a peer
rst heks if it has already reeived the same pulse and if not, veries the
RR n° 6594
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Server at time i:
l e t (K
i
pub
, K
i
priv ) = generate_pair ( ) ;
l e t S
i
= sign ( <i , K
i
pub
>, KSpriv ) ;
l e t T
i
= Pulse ( i , Ki
pub
, K
i
priv , S
i
) ;
∀q ∈ NSserver , send ( q , Ti ) ;
Figure 2: Pulse generation at the server.
Node p reeiving Ti= Pulse(i, Ki
pub
, K
i
priv, S
i
):
i f T
i /∈ His to ryp and
v e r i f y (S
i
, <i , K
i
pub
>, KSpub )
then
add ( Hi s to ryp , T
i
) ;
∀q ∈ NSp , send ( q , Ti ) ;
end i f
Figure 3: Pulse diusion by a peer.
Node p sending to q its availability at time i:
l e t b i t s = new b i t f i e l d [Nt ℄ ;
f o r x i n [ 1 . .Nt ℄
i f ∃ Tj ∈His to ryp | j ∈ [i − xP, i − xP + P [ then
b i t s [x ℄ := 0
e l s e
b i t s [x ℄ := 1
end i f
end f o r
l e t S = s ign ( < i , b i t s >, Kp,priv )
send ( q , Av a i l a b i l i t y ( i , b i t s , S ) ) ;
Figure 4: Advertisement of availability by a peer.
authentiity of the pulse. If the pulse is indeed generated by the server, it
updates its history and forwards the pulse to its neighbors (ode Fig. 3).
4.2 Inquiry Protool
Depending on the appliation, peers need to be able to hek the availabil-
ity of other peers. This might be done either regularly or just the rst time
they onnet to eah other. The veriation of availability requires know-
ing the pulse history of peers. For this purpose, eah peer sends a message
Availability(i,biteld,S), where i is the urrent time, and biteld is an array
of bits of size Nt, ontaining, for eah period, 1 if it has the pulse, and 0 other-
wise (ode Fig. 4). The message also ontains a signature of the bit eld using
the peer private key, Kp,priv. This signature an be used to prove later that
the message was sent by the peer, in partiular, if the peer does not reply to a
hallenge.
INRIA
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Node p reeiving Challenge(i, none) from node q:
i f Pulse (i , Ki
pub
, K
i
priv , S
i
) ∈ His to ryp then
l e t r ep ly = s ign ( < none , Hp , Hq >, K
i
priv )
send ( q , Proof ( i , none , Ki
pub
, S
i
, r ep ly ) ) ;
end i f
Figure 5: Reply to a hallenge by a peer (one bit to simplify)
Node q reeiving Proof(i,none,Ki
pub
,S
i
, reply) from node p:
i f ( i , none , p) ∈ ha l l e ng e s q and
v e r i f y (S
i
, <i , K
i
pub
>, KSpub ) and
v e r i f y ( reply , < none , Hp , Hq >, K
i
pub
)
then
good_reply (p)
e l s e
bad_reply (p)
end i f
Figure 6: Veriation of a proof by a peer (one bit to simplify).
Using the bit eld of another peer, a peer an ompute an approximation of
the availability of the peer during the period (Nt * P) by ounting how many
bits are set to one. Note that, in fat, the bit eld only proves that the peer
was online when the pulses were propagated and not during omplete hours.
However, we show in our simulations that sending the pulse at a random time
in the urrent period provides a very good approximation of the real availability.
4.3 Veriation Protool
It is in the interest of some peers to lie about their uptime, espeially to get
more resoures than they deserve. We thus provide a veriation sheme to
allow a peer to verify that the bit eld reeived from another peer is orret.
More speially, to hallenge a given peer, a peer selets one bit set to 1 in the
bit eld reeived from this peer (this an be easily generalized to several bits
hallenged at one). It sends a speial request Challenge(i,none), ontaining
i, the period of the bit to be veried, and none, whih is a randomly generated
short string to make the hallenge unique. On reeption of Challenge(i,none),
the peer replies Proof(i,none, Kipub, S
i
,reply) where K
i
pub and S
i
are respetively
the publi key and the signature from pulse T
i
, and reply is the signature of none
and the hashes of the identities of the two peers by the the private key K
i
priv
(ode Fig. 5). On reeption of Proof(i, none, Kipub, S
i
, reply), the peer an
verify that reply is the signature with the orret key K
i
priv, using the key K
i
pub
from the message, and an also verify that K
i
pub is the publi key from the pulse
T
i
using the signature S
i
and the well known KSpub key (ode Fig. 6).
The ations to be taken when a peer fails to provide a orret reply to a
Challenge message is out of the sope of this paper sine it mostly depends
RR n° 6594
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Trae Size Length Sessions Availability Absolute Error
peers days < 1h  > 1d < 25%  > 75% < 1%  > 3%
Skype Superpeers[11℄ 2081 29 15% 80% 5% 60% 22% 18 % 95% 4% 1%
Mirosoft Desktops[3℄ 51663 10 0% 85% 15% 15% 15% 70% 97% 3% 0%
Overnet Clients[1℄ 1469 7 39% 61% 0% 49% 44% 7% 58% 32% 10%
Synth. Uniform 100000 20 30% 68% 2% 20% 60% 20% 20% 70% 10%
Synth. Exponential 100000 20 27% 61% 2% 80% 15% 5% 20% 78% 2%
Figure 7: We ran simulations using a few availability traes olleted for dierent
workloads. Exept the Skype workload, suh systems are not representative
of real appliations for Paemaker: Mirosoft network exhibits a very small
hurn, typial of ompany networks, whereas on the ontrary, Overnet's hurn
is very high, even for a le-sharing appliation (atually muh higher than reent
observations on the Edonkey network).
on the appliation using our measurement system. However, our protool is
designed so that it is possible to propagate both the Availability and the
Challenge messages to other peers in the network. Hene, other peers are
allowed to use a not replied Challenge message to hallenge the same peer
again. To avoid false laims, the peers might use the Availability messages
to hek that the message was indeed signed by a selsh peer. If some pulses
are damaged on a peer due to a failure, thus preventing veriation, the peer is
expeted to lear the orresponding bits from its availability history.
5 Evaluation Road-map
The main goal of our evaluation study is to illustrate that Paemaker is:
 Salable: It an aommodate the growth of the system; it is able to
work with millions of peers onneted together.
 Aurate: The error between the measured and real availability of a peer
is negligible.
 Low-ost: It is less expensive than other systems providing a similar
measure.
 Seure: The measure still reets the reality even though selsh peers
may try to modify it. Furthermore, it is able to detet lying nodes timely.
 Easy-to-deploy: It an be implemented easily and deployed with mini-
mal onguration on the peers.
We studied Paemaker via a ombination of analysis, simulations using real
and syntheti traes and an implementation on a 170 node Planetlab testbed.
In the remainder of this paper, we rst present the performane of Paemaker
as an availability measurement system using simulation results on the syntheti
traes. Although, we also ran simulations with real traes (see Fig. 7), we omit
these results for the sake of brevity, espeially beause syntheti traes allow
us to evaluate Paemaker on larger-sale networks (100,000 peers) with more
extreme availability distributions (uniform and exponential).
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Next, we present results where Paemaker operates in the presene of selsh
peers that try to heat the system by advertising a higher availability. Our
goal in these experiments is to show that Paemaker is able to provide au-
rate availability measurements in an eient manner even in the presene of
suh selsh peers. Finally, we onlude with a disussion on implementation
details. Essentially, the Planetlab experiments illustrate the ease of deployment
of Paemaker in a realisti setting.
6 Availability Monitoring with Paemaker
The rst goal of our evaluation study is to prove the salability of Paemaker,
the auray of its availability measurements and the negligible load it adds
to the system. To this end, our simulation setup onsists of two parts: (1)
the availability patterns of peers and (2) the unstrutured overlay network (the
mesh) onneting peers and the server. In this setion, we rst present this
setup in detail and next, the performane results in omparison to a ping-based
availability measurement system.
6.1 Simulating the Availability of Peers
In the syntheti traes used by our simulations, availability follows either a uni-
form or exponential distribution. While working with the uniform distribution
allows us to span all values of availability, the exponential distribution is more
representative of real peer-to-peer systems [1℄. Based on these two distributions,
the availability of a peer y, ay, is alulated as:
ay =
{
0.02 + 0.98 · U(0, 1) if uni.
max(0.02,min(1, e1−ln (2+65·U(0,1)))) if exp.
(1)
Additionally, the number of disonnetions per day, dy for eah peer follows
a uniform distribution: dy = U(0, 10). Using ay and dy, the probabilities to
swith between ON (i.e., online and available) and OFF (i.e., oine and not
available) states are omputed as follows.
λy =
dy
24×60 (2)
µy =
ay×λy
1−ay
(3)
Using these two probabilities, the Markov hain depited in Fig. 8 drives the
state hanges. Additionally, to aount for the eet of the timezones, this
Markov hain is modied to obtain a diurnal pattern: during the day, peers
have twie their normal probability of swithing to ON and half their normal
probability of swithing to OFF.
The resulting availability patterns are presented in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, whih
depit the number of online peers and the session lengths of peers, respetively,
for uniform and exponential distributions. Fig. 9 shows that the number of
available peers per round is lower with exponential distribution ompared to
uniform distribution. Essentially, while with exponential distribution, the num-
ber of available peers per round is approximately 25,000 during the day and
10,000 during the night, for the uniform distribution, the number of available
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ON OFF
1− λj 1− µj
λj
µj
Figure 8: Online and oine times of a peer are omputed using a Markov hain with
probabilities λ and µ.
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Figure 9: Number of peers online over time. Sine the timezones of peers are only on
12 hours, the number of peers follow a diurnal pattern, whih would not be the ase
if the distribution was over 24 hours.
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Figure 10: CDF of Sessions lengths. The median session length is around two hours.
peers is 65,000 during the day and 35,000 during the night. Fig. 10 shows that,
as expeted from Fig. 9, there are a higher number of sessions in the ase of
uniform distribution ompared to exponential distribution. The session lengths
range from a minute to a few days for both distributions and the median session
length is around two hours.
6.2 Overlay Network Setup
We use a mesh that onnets all peers and a single server. The server diuses
pulses through this mesh every hour (i.e., unit time P = 1 hour) to measure
the availability of peers. In our simulations, the mesh is formed as follows: the
server has an out-degree of 10 (alled hildren in the sequel), and eah peer
has a out-degree (hildren) and in-degree (parents) of 5. Although many other
approahes ould be onsidered to build the mesh, we used the simple following
protool: to onnet to the mesh, a peer rst sends an AskRoot message to the
server, whih replies with a list of its hildren in the graph. The peer then sends
AskParent messages to the hildren. Every hild either aepts the peer as a
hild, or sends a random hild among its hildren. The proess iterates until
the peer is onneted to 5 dierent parents.
We added the following loal optimizations to improve the mesh:
 At every round, if a peer has a free hild slot, it hooses among all the
hild andidates the one with the best measured availability. To this end,
in our simulations, eah peer delays its response to AskParent messages
by 1 minute to be able to hoose the best andidate.
 To derease the diameter of the network, a peer disonnets the hildren
that are at the same distane from the server. The distane information
is learned either from the AskParent or the Distane update messages,
whih are sent by a peer eah time its distane to the server hanges.
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Figure 11: The number of AskRoot messages reeived by the server per minute in
our simulations. The mean rate is 1/50 of the number of nodes, i.e. 100,000 nodes
onsume 33 messages per seond. Even in our simplied mesh, a few servers an easily
handle a few millions of peers.
Obviously, for peers that do not have a parent, the distane to the server
is innity. Otherwise, peers advertise their minimum distane to the server
through their urrent parents. Note that the well-known ount-to-innity
problem might our during the Distane updates and is resolved similar
to [12℄ by hoosing a small number (e.g., 10) for innity.
While we hose this spei mesh generation protool here for its simpliity,
the mesh ould be built dierently based on the appliation requirements and
the servie desired. Paemaker only requires the underlying mesh to be able to
diuse the pulses suessfully, whih is a reasonable expetation. Sine Pae-
maker relies on diusion of pulses, the salability and eieny of our protool
and the auray of the availability measurement depends on the underlying
mesh. Therefore, we rst show the salability of the mesh used in our simula-
tions by ounting the number of AskRoot messages reeived by the server from
new or reonneting peers (see Fig. 11). We evaluate the number of AskRoot
messages for both uniform and exponential availability distributions with 1,000,
10,000 and 100,000 peers. As expeted, as the number of peers inreases, the
number of AskRoot messages also inreases. Furthermore, with uniform dis-
tribution, sine the number of sessions is higher, we observe a higher number
of messages sent per minute. This is beause the peers in our simulations are
memoryless and hene, eah time they ome bak online, they need to redisover
parents. Nevertheless, even with this property, Fig. 11 shows that the mesh is
salable: the number of AskRootmessages grows to only 1000 when the number
of peers inreases to 100,000. Note that this basially translates to less than 10
kB/s tra load on the server, whih is very reasonable.
To understand the salability of the onstruted mesh further, Fig. 12 plots
the maximal hop-distane to the server. As expeted, it grows logarithmially
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Figure 12: Maximal distane to the server over time. Note that the diameter of the
network is not too high.
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Figure 14: Mean availability of onneted peers depending on their distane to the
server. The peers loser to the server have a higher availability that farther peers.
with the number of peers in the network. More speially, the maximum
number of hops range between 5 and 12 depending on the number of peers and
the availability distribution. The eet of this is also seen in Fig. 13, whih
shows the time it takes for a new peer to nd its rst parent. This delay is
more than 10 minutes only for less than 1/1000 of the onnetions. Essentially,
these delays, whih are on the order of a few minutes, an be onsidered as
negligible, sine we are interested in measuring availability for long sessions
(i.e., the median session length is two hours).
Finally, the eet of our loal optimizations are depited in Fig. 14, where
the mean availability of peers versus their distane to the server is plotted. The
gure shows that peers lose to the server have a higher availability than peers
farther away. This is due to prioritizing peers with higher availability when
seleting hildren. Without suh a prioritization, we would not observe this
eet and the mesh would be less stable.
6.3 Results on Auray
In this setion, we present results in terms of auray and ost-eetiveness
of Paemaker. We simulate 100,000 peers for 20 days (i.e., 28,800 minutes).
Every round in the simulation takes one minute. From a ommuniation point
of view, this puts some timeout on messages, whih allows us to detet peer
disonnetions (for instane, TCP keepalive is 30 seonds).
For eah peer in the network, we ompute the auray as the dierene
between its real availability and the availability measured by our system (i.e. the
availability that it is able to prove to other peers). Essentially, this represents
the absolute error, plotted on Fig. 15 for both the uniform and exponential
distributions. Our measured availability mathes the real availability of peers
when the pulse period, P, is 1 hour. Uniform random distribution exhibits the
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Figure 15: Measured availability ompared to real availability for uniform distribution.
Note that the dierene is negligible.
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Figure 16: The error in measured availability versus P for exponential distribution
worst ase: for 70% of the peers, the absolute error is less than 1%, for the next
20% of the peers, it is less than 3%, and never exeeds 10% (of time).
Obviously, if we redue the pulse period P, we an ahieve better auray
but at a higher ost. Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 show the auray of Paemaker as
P ranges between 10 minutes to 2 hours. For both distributions, while P = 2
hours would ahieve the best ost, it also provides the lowest auray (i.e., the
error is signiantly higher). While the error immediately improves with P = 1
hour, for lower P values, Paemaker performs with omparable auray. This
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Figure 17: The error in measured availability versus P for uniform distribution
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Figure 18: A omparison between Paemaker and ping-based system for uniform dis-
tribution. Paemaker is equivalent to a ping-based system that uses 5 and 10 observers
for eah peer.
shows that Paemaker ahieves a good trade-o between auray and ost.
Note that in our simulations, peers aept unordered pulses (i.e., a pulse for a
given time would be aepted even if a pulse for a later time has already been
reeived). Not following this poliy an degrade the auray of the measure for
small values of P as the peer distane to the server inreases.
We believe that even in the worst ase, the auray of Paemaker is a-
eptable for a majority of the appliations sine 1-5% error does not hange the
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Figure 19: A omparison between Paemaker and the ping-based system for expo-
nential distribution. Paemaker performs better than a ping-based system with 20
observers for eah peer.
availability lass of a peer (as disussed in Setion 3). Furthermore, we ompare
Paemaker with a system where eah peer in the network is monitored every
minute using pings by a small set of randomly seleted observers (similar to
AVMON [19℄). Fig. 18 shows that for the uniform distribution, the ping-based
system ahieves high auray (i.e., negligible error) with only a low number
(5-10) observers. However, this does not hold for the more realisti exponential
distribution, as seen in Fig. 19. In this ase, the ping-based system must use a
higher number of observers (e.g., 20 observers) to reah the same auray as
Paemaker. On the other hand, in the worst ase, Paemaker has a ost of 10
Pulse messages per peer (if the mesh degree is 10) and per hour (if the period
P is one hour). Furthermore, note that in a ping-based system, no measure-
ments an be taken if the observers are down, whih is often the ase for the
exponential distribution. Therefore, Paemaker provides more auray as its
availability measurement does not depend on a xed set of observers.
7 Paemaker against Selsh Peers
While Paemaker ahieves good auray in environments where no selsh peers
are present, it is essential to maintain similar performane when peers exhibit
selsh behavior. In the following setion, we evaluate how Paemaker handles
dierent selsh behaviors, whih are identied in Setion 3. These behaviors,
translated into Paemaker ontext, are namely:
 Lazy peers: These peers do not propagate pulses so that other peers
have a lower measured availability.
 Opportunisti peers: These peers only onnet to the mesh to reeive
the pulses and immediately disonnet afterward.
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Figure 20: Error on measured availability depending on the number of lazy peers in
the system. Although lazy peers do not propagate the pulses to their neighbors, the
error is under 10% with 50% of lazy peers in the network, and almost not aeted
with 30% of lazy peers.
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Figure 21: Error on measured availability with lazy peers with a uniform distribution
 Lying peers: These peers lie about their availability.
7.1 Lazy Peers
Lazy peers prevent other peers from beneting from the system by not prop-
agating the pulses to their neighbors. Basially, lazy peers do not follow the
protool when the protool ations have a ost and no diret benet. As an
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Figure 22: Availabilities measured using either random heks or by requiring some
onnetion length. It shows that sending the pulse randomly (at a random minute
during the pulse hour) performs muh better than requiring a minimal session length
(from 5 to 50 minutes) from a hild to propagate the pulse.
additional onsequene, these peers may improve their ratings in the system by
dereasing the measured availability of other peers rather than laiming a higher
availability like the lying peers. To evaluate the impat of lazy peers, we ran-
domly seleted peers as lazy peers in our simulations. The results, depited in
Fig. 20, show that the auray of the availability measure is not aeted muh
(i.e., the error remains under 10%) until the perentage of lazy peers hits 50%.
This good results are a diret property of the degree hosen for our simulation
mesh. Hene, we onlude that:
 When there is a low number of lazy peers (i.e., up to 30% of lazy peers),
their impat is negligible on the measured availability of other peers.
Hene, lazy peers do not sueed in reduing the availability of their neigh-
bors.
 When there is a high number of lazy peers (i.e., greater than 50%), their
impat is more signiant but their measured availability is also as dimin-
ished as the one of ollaborative peers sine they are also aeted by other
lazy peers that do not propagate pulses.
7.2 Opportunisti Peers
Opportunisti peers try to heat the system by onneting to the network only
to get pulses to inrease their pereived availability. In our system, suh peers
would onnet at xed times, depending on the shedule of pulse diusion. To
avoid opportunisti behavior, we propose two dierent poliies:
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 Random diusion: Within eah period P, the server starts the pulse
diusion at a random time. Hene, the opportunisti peers annot foreast
when to onnet to the network.
 Trusted diusion: When a peer reeives a pulse, it only propagates
the pulse to hildren whih have been onneted for a long time. Hene,
opportunisti peers never reeive pulses.
Fig. 22 plots the impat of these poliies on the auray of measured avail-
ability. It shows that random diusion performs muh better as soon as the
required session length for hildren beomes too long. Essentially, trusted dif-
fusion requires guessing the average neighbor session length to avoid punishing
good neighbors that do not have long session length. This might be diult
sine the session lengths exhibit a high variane. Hene, we used random diu-
sion in all our simulations.
7.3 Lying Peers
In ontrast to lazy and opportunist peers, lying peers try to ahieve a higher
status in the network by advertising false availability information. In our sys-
tem, this is simply done by swithing a 0 bit to 1 in the availability bit eld.
Paemaker provides peers with the ability to hallenge peers based on their
advertised availability. Using this sheme, the probability that a hallenger y
disovers that x is lying in a given try is determined by two fators:
 How many bits x lied about (i.e., how many bits are swithed from 0 to
1)
 How many bits y hallenges
In this paper, we did not onsider the ase of hallenging the entire bit eld
due to the high omputational overhead and the growth in message size. Hene,
in a given try, only a xed number of bits, denoted as i, are hallenged. Our
goal is to alulate the probability that a hallenge sent to peer x sueeds
when i bits are hallenged. Given the number of swithed bits, nswitched, and
the number of orret bits, ncorrect, (whih add up to the total number of 1-bits
in the bit eld) p(x, 1) an be alulated as:
p(x, 1) =
nswitched(x)
ncorrect(x) + nswitched(x)
(4)
This an be generalized to i bits as follows. A hallenge would not sueed if
and only if all the hallenged i bits are orret. Hene,
p(x, i) = 1−Πi−1k=0
ncorrect(x)− k
ncorrect(x) + nswitched(x)− k
(5)
Fig. 23 shows how p(x, i) inreases with i when the perentage of nswitched bits
among the total number of 1-bits is 5, 10, 25 and 50%, respetively. Note that
when the lying perentage is low, p(x, i) is also low - even though it improves
with inreasing i. On the other hand, at a given hallenge, when the lying
perentage is high, it is more probable to detet liars even when i is low. For
instane, for i = 3, p(x, i) = 0.89 when lying perentage is 50%.
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Figure 23: p(x, i) when 5, 10, 25 and 50% of the 1-bits are swithed. p(x, i) inreases
as the lying perentage and the number of hallenged bits inrease.
However, the probability of deteting a lying peer does not only depend on
p(x, i) but also on how and when the hallenges are sent by the peers. Our
protool does not expliitly speify when hallenges should be sent to peers and
how the system should reat when a peer fails to reply to a hallenge sine
these are stritly appliation-dependent. However, in this setion, we outline a
generi strategy for dealing with lying peers and based on this strategy analyze
the probability and the time to detet them in a given system.
We assume that eah peer is working with m peers on average for the needs
of the appliation. A peer y an hallenge a peer x as a step of one of their
onnetions, and that a suessful response is mandatory for any interation af-
terwards. Hene, both peers should be awake (whih is governed by the Markov
hain depited in Fig. 8). The probability that y is in ON state is p
y
ON =
µy
λy+µy
.
Similarly, the probability that x is ON is pxON . Sine these probabilities are in-
dependent, the probability that x an be onneted to and hallenged by y,
pc(x, y), is
pc(x, y) = p
x
ON · p
y
ON (6)
Let's assume y hallenges x with a known frequeny, f . Depending on this
frequeny, the probability that the lying peer x is deteted by y, pdetect(x, y),
during the system time ts is:
pdetect(x, y) = 1− (1− pc(x, y) · p(x, i))
f ·ts
(7)
In other words, a lying peer will only be not deteted if all the suessfully sent
hallenges have a suessful response during ts. Note that pdetect(x, y) is simply
the probability of nding the swithed bits in the bit eld of x. The atual
detetion happens when x annot respond to the hallenge (e.g., by not sending
a proof or sending a false proof).
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With m peers working with x and thus hallenging x, the probability of
deteting an lying peer x, pdetect(x), is:
pdetect(x) = 1−Π
m
y=1(1 − pdetect(x, y)) (8)
Again, x will only be not deteted, if all m peers fail to detet its lie.
In addition to detetion probability, average detetion time is also important
as it aets how fast we an reover from availability measurement errors. To
alulate the average detetion time, tdetect, we rst need to alulate the prob-
ability of deteting a lying peer x on the nth try. We denote this probability as
pndetect(x, y) and alulate it as:
pndetect(x, y) = (1 − pc(x, y) · p(x, i))
n−1
· pc(x, y) · p(x, i) (9)
Sine this follows a geometri distribution, the mean number of tries neessary
for y to detet x is 1
pc(x,y)·p(x,i)
. Sine there are m peers hallenging x, x will be
deteted whenever one of these peers disovers its lie. Hene, average detetion
time of x depends on the minimum of the average number of tries neessary
among m peers. Sine the time between eah hallenge is 1
f
, the average time
to detet a lying peer, tdetect is:
tdetect =
1
f
·min
y
1
pc(x, y) · p(x, i)
(10)
To understand if Paemaker an detet lying peers eiently, we study a net-
work where eah peer is hallenged by m = 5 peers. Peers send a hallenge one
every day (i.e, f = 1) for a system time, ts = 15 days. Note that under uniform
distribution, the average availability of a hallenging peer is 51%, whereas this
is 8% for exponential distribution. Furthermore, based on Fig. 23, i is seleted
as 3. We next analyze the pdetect(x) when the lying peer x is 5%, 10%, 25%
and 50% available in the system. Moreover, we assume x lies uniformly random
based on its availability. In other words, if it is 5% available it tries to improve
its availability by U(1%,95%). Based on this lying behaviour, the following
(availability, average lying) values are analyzed: (0.05, 0.48), (0.1, 0.46), (0.25,
0.38) and (0.5, 0.26). Given this setting, using Eqs. 5-8, we plot pdetect(x) in
Fig. 24. As expeted, due to the low average availability of peers, the proba-
bility of deteting a lying peer is lower for exponential distribution ompared
to uniform distribution. However, note that, for both ases, the probability of
detetion is high if the lying peers are online 50%. Atually, it is important to
ath these peers sine lying peers with less than 10% availability are not using
the system anyway. Similarly, Fig. 25 shows that under uniform distribution,
the lying peers are expeted to be aught faster than exponential distribution.
However, as a lying peer's presene inreases in the system, the detetion time
dereases aordingly for both distributions.
Our analysis results are also onrmed by simulation results, whih are de-
pited in Fig. 26 and Fig. 27 for uniform and exponential distributions, respe-
tively. In our simulations, 5% of the population onsists of lying peers. We
wait for ve days to reah a stable network before sending hallenges (this is
the reason why the number of lying peers stays at in both gures upto 5 days
and then starts dereasing). The results show that the lying peers are deteted
in aordane with the analysis: faster for uniform distribution and slower for
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Figure 25: tdetect(x) with dierent availability and lying 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Figure 26: The measured and real availability, and the remaining number of lying
peers in the system with time (for uniform distribution).
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Figure 27: The measured and real availability, and the remaining number of lying
peers in the system with time (for exponential distribution).
exponential distribution. More speially, as predited from Fig. 25, almost
all lying peers are aught after the 10th day (i.e., in 5 days) for uniform distri-
bution. On the other hand, for exponential distribution, almost 20% liars are
waiting to be deteted after 15 days (see Fig. 27). However, we see that one
the system starts deteting and removing lying peers from the network, the
measured system availability approahes the real system availability for both
distributions.
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8 Implementation
As a rst step towards real deployment, we ran Paemaker over 170 nodes of the
Planet-Lab network for one month sine September 24, 2008. In this setion,
we present the details of our implementation and initial results.
8.1 Implementation Details
Paemaker was implemented as a single program, written in Objetive-Caml.
It uses openSSL for ryptography and network libraries for peer-to-peer om-
muniations from our previous work (MLdonkey [14℄, Peerple [8℄), speially,
for marshaling messages and establishing ommuniations. One of the most
important features of Paemaker is its ease of deployability: It took a single
programmer less than a week to implement and fully deploy it (inluding an
additional auto-upgrade feature).
In our implementation, an option is used to deide the role of the node in
the system at start-up. These roles are:
 Client: A standard peer in the network.
 Server: A server peer, whih diuses pulses in the network periodially.
 Master: A logger peer, whih doesn't run the Paemaker protool but
instead, all peers onnet to it every hour to upload their logs. This is done
to be able to analyze these logs to evaluate the performane of Paemaker.
The entire system an be divided into three parts: (1) our Paemaker proto-
ol, (2) a mesh protool for building the network and (3) a le sharing protool
for logging and software update purposes. All of these protools ontain 12
messages in total, as listed below:
 Paemaker: 4 messages, whih are Pulse, Availability, Challenge
and Proof, and their handlers have been implemented. However, sine we
are not running any real appliation and have no selsh nodes, only Pulse
messages are sent in our experiments.
 Mesh: The mesh protool builds the underlying network using 3 mes-
sages. The AskParent and AskParentReply messages are used to estab-
lish permanent links between peers and propagate other parent andidates.
The Distane message helps dereasing the diameter of the network.
 File sharing: Finally, we use 5 messages to transfer les between peers
and synhronize diretories. These messages allow:
 Logging: The log diretory of every peer is synhronized with the
master. In eah synhronization only new or modied les are trans-
fered.
 Software updates: To diuse a new binary in the network, one of the
lients is updated, whih in turn starts a gossip of this update.
The nal program is 2000 lines of Objetive-Caml ode, where 400 lines are
message desriptions (among whih 140 lines are for Paemaker), 700 lines are
handlers (among whih only 70 lines are for Paemaker; the le sharing feature
is the most verbose) and 250 lines are for the main funtionality.
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Figure 28: Availability Error in Planet-Lab evaluation, 165 nodes
8.2 Deployment Details
To deploy Paemaker, we used three omputers in our lab. One of these served
as the server and also propagated software updates in the network. The seond
omputer ated as a normal lient to enable loal debugging of problems. The
third omputer was the master. Next, we got aess to one Planet-Lab slie,
where we rst started with 10 nodes, then 50 nodes after two days, and nally
deployed Paemaker on 170 nodes. However, due to a restarting problem with
rond daemon after node rashes, the number of nodes running Paemaker
was observed to go down as low as 145 before the rond daemon is restarted
manually. Therefore, the results presented in the next setion are on one day
inluding 165 nodes.
8.3 Results
The initial results with our Planet-Lab deployment are depited in Fig. 28.
These results show that using Paemaker, the error in availability measure re-
mained below 1% for 90% of the peers. Only for the 6% of the peers, the error
was higher than 3%. We also deployed a ping-based availability measurement
system to be able to ompare it against Paemaker. The gure shows that the
ping-based system both with 5 and 20 observers perform similarly to Paemaker
in terms of auray. However, note that Paemaker ahieves this auray level
with a lower ost. Furthermore, the similarity in auray performane is also
not surprising beause the availability of nodes in our slie did not show muh
variation. Comparing ping-based system with 5 observers against 20 observers
also onrms this as the inrease in the number of observers did not improve
the availability measure. In the future, we plan to use Paemaker in a real peer-
to-peer bakup storage system to evaluate its performane in more dynami
settings.
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8.4 Disussion
Our goal with a Planet-Lab implementation was to show the ease-of-deployment
of Paemaker. However, sine there were no selsh peers in the network, we
were not able to test the availability notiations and the veriation of peer
availability. Nevertheless, it is important to evaluate the ost of Paemaker
when Availability, Challenge and Proof messages are sent. Espeially the
ost of bandwidth needs to be onsidered sine it is usually the rarest resoure
in peer-to-peer networks.
In Paemaker, bandwidth is mainly onsumed during the exhange of sig-
natures and keys in pulse messages. With RSA, these signatures and keys are
typially 256 bytes long. This ost an further be redued by using ellipti
urves, whih ahieve a good level of seurity with around 15 bytes. Therefore,
we do not expet Paemaker to inur high osts. For instane, if we use RSA,
the size of the messages sent by Paemaker an be alulated approximately for
a year (i.e, Nt = 8760) as:
 Pulse : 800 B (2 keys and 1 signature)
 Availability : 1400 B (bit eld[N_t℄ + 1 signature)
 Challenge : 70 B (a none of 64 B)
 Proof : 900 B (none + 1 key + 2 signatures)
Note that the pulse message is sent one per period P to all the neighbors.
Other messages would probably only be sent one a day between two peers
working together. Consequently, we expet the bandwidth ost of Paemaker
to be negligible.
9 Related Work
In this setion, we rst present urrent researh on peer-to-peer networks that
relies on availability information. Suh systems serve as our main motivation to
provide availability information seurely in the presene selsh peers. Next, we
disuss related work on availability measurement, fousing speially on their
operation in the presene of selsh peers.
9.1 Uses of Availability Information in P2P Networks
The majority of the researh on building peer-to-peer networks heavily relies
on information about stability or availability of peers. Indeed, many systems
rely on a stable ore or super-peers, whih are seleted for their high availability
in the system. For instane, [1℄ and [4℄ report that, in Gnutella and Overnet,
respetively, the peers with higher availability tend to be more stable than
other peers. Based on this result, [1℄ proposes a protool that builds a more
stable network by seleting peers with higher availability. However, the proposed
solution annot ope with selsh peers that might lie about their real availability
to get a better status in the system. Similarly in [21℄, a gradient topology is built
so that the most stable peers are at the ore of the network and the less stable
peers stay on the border. However, selsh peers an laim higher availability
to be inluded in the ore, and then refuse to serve requests even though they
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Paemaker AVMON
Arhiteture Pulses Pings
Durability Unlimited Limited (hurn)
Supported Topologies
Internet Yes Yes
Ad-ho Networks Yes No
Soial Networks Yes No
Firewalled Peers Yes No
Vulnerabilities
Selsh Peers Resilient Not Treated
Colluding Peers Not Treated Vulnerable
Figure 29: Comparison with AVMON [19℄. See setion 9.2 for details.
benet from their good position in the network. In [9℄, availability information is
used to selet super-peers in the network to build a top-level Chord Distributed
Hash Table (DHT) over another less stable DHT. Again, selsh peers might
manage to be inluded in the top-level DHT, and use their position to derease
their load.
In addition to help build more stable networks, availability information is
also useful for repairing the network. For instane, using availability informa-
tion, replaement poliies derease the eet of hurn in a peer-to-peer sys-
tem [10℄. It was shown that, although performing well, the performane of
a random replaement annot reah the performane of a replaement poliy
based on hoosing peers with maximum availability. Similarly, in [7℄, availabil-
ity information is used to proatively repair fragments in a peer-to-peer storage
system based on an estimation of the failure rate. Finally, in [22℄ an objet
replia maintenane system is studied under temporary and permanent failures
for dierent peer-to-peer systems. It is shown that data tends to aumulate on
nodes with high availability and unlimited apaity. Essentially, if the apa-
ity is limited, the performane degrades when the nodes with high availability
beome saturated as the nodes with low availability trigger many repairs. Ob-
viously, if the availability information is ompromised in any of these systems,
repairs would not be possible.
9.2 Comparison with AVMON
Availability measurement systems an be lassied into two ategories: lok-
based systems, where measures are based on the loal lok and ping-based sys-
tems where measures are done by hello messages. Paemaker introdues a new
ategory, pulse-based systems, where measures are based on pulses ooded in the
network. Clok-based systems suh as [18℄ are obviously vulnerable to selsh
peers.
We introdued and evaluated ping-based systems in Setion 6.3. Our results
show that, to get the same level of auray as Paemaker in a realisti sys-
tem, a peer in a ping-based system needs to send 25 ping messages per hour,
while a peer in Paemaker only needs to send 5 diusion messages per hour.
Indeed, in ping-based systems, peers an only monitor availability when they
are online, so more monitors are needed to ope with hurn. Moreover, their
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measures beome unavailable as soon as they leave the system. Finally, peers
behind rewalls annot be monitored, whereas Paemaker an still reah them.
Therefore, measurements are less aurate, less eient and less durable.
To the best of our knowledge, AVMON [19℄ is the only ping-based system
designed with seurity in mind. By using a hash funtion to math observers
and observed peers, AVMON tries to avoid that peers laim higher availability
than the reality by olluding with other peers. AVMON suers from both the
drawbaks of ping-based systems and the drawbaks of its hash-based sheme,
as detailed in [13℄. From a seurity point-of-view, selsh observers an still lie
about the availability of the peers that they are supposed to monitor. Moreover,
the hash mehanism is vulnerable to ollusion: peers an hange their listening
port until they are aepted as observers for the peers with whom they want to
ollude.
9.3 Colluding Peers
As other availability measurement systems, Paemaker annot yet ope with
olluding peers, but it is, to the best of our knowledge, the only one resilient to
selsh peers. Nevertheless, we think that, rst, ollusion is harder to implement
than selshness, and seond, it should be possible to extend Paemaker to ope
with ollusion.
Indeed, selshness requires only small modiations of the software (to lie
on bitmaps) or of the environment (to lter out pings or requests in ping-
based systems). On the ontray, ollusion requires deep modiations of the
software (extension of the protool) and ompliity of other peers that need to
be disovered on the network. For the rst part, there is a game-theori inentive
not to diuse suh modied software for olluding: the bigger the number of
peers olluding, the smaller the benet for eah olluding lient. Moreover,
lients trying to disover other olluding lients openly an be deteted by honey-
pots, i.e. lients aepting to ollude only to detet olluders, and able to
blaklist them on a system-wide sale. Consequently, ollusion an be expeted
to be limited to a few manually reated groups of modied lients trusting eah
other.
There are also several approahes to extend Paemaker to ope with ollu-
sion. A rst approah would be to insert in the pulse the path of IP addresses
followed during its diusion. Suh a sheme would help blaklisting lients that
keep diusing old pulses to other peers to disrupt the system. Another approah
would be to trak modiations of the history of pulses of a lient, to detet if
an old pulse is added, to limit the time during whih ollusion an happen. Fi-
nally, we are also investigating a more interesting approah, loser to Paemaker
spirit, based on the use of Merkle trees [17℄, to atually enode the presene of
a peer in the system diretly in the pulse.
10 Conlusion
In this paper, we have presented a simple but eient way of monitoring avail-
ability in peer-to-peer systems in the presene of selsh peers. Our protool,
Paemaker, uses a set of servers to propagate ryptographi pulse messages in a
mesh of peers, allowing them to measure and hek the history of availability of
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other peers easily at any time. Paemaker is resistant to selsh behaviors, and
in partiular to lying peers, whih lie about their availability to gain aess to
more resoures in the system.
We have evaluated Paemaker through analysis, simulations and deployed
the protool on a Planet-Lab testbed. Our results show that Paemaker is
aurate, able to detet selsh behaviors, less expensive than ompetitors and
easy to deploy. Furthermore, the low overhead indued by Paemaker enables
not to hamper the salability of the peer-to-peer overlay network.
Paemaker also introdues a new network arhiteture, pulse-based systems,
that, we think, ould have multiple appliations in self-organizing systems. We
are now investigating some of these appliations, for example in the ontext of
sensor networks. As disussed in setion 9.3, we are also working on dierent
approahes to extend Paemaker to ope with olluding peers.
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